ABSTRACT With the development of cognitive radio networks in recent years, spectrum utilization has been enhanced, as secondary users can lease under-utilized spectrum from the spectrum owners. Spectrum is allocated through auctions in wireless communication networks. The auction can provide benefits for both primary users and secondary users. Existing auction mechanisms for spectrum are mainly based on interference graphs and consider the heterogeneity of spectrums only to a minimal degree. The economic efficiency of the auction is usually neglected due to the focus on improving spectrum utilization. In this paper, we consider a signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constrained interference model; this model is more realistic as users can simultaneously communicate as long as their requirements SINRs are satisfied. We propose a truthful profit maximization double auction mechanism to improve the benefit of networks with low energy. At the same time, security concerns are guaranteed because buyers and sellers make their true critical decision, i.e., they cannot improve their utility by misreporting their asks and bids. Moreover, our proposed novel auction mechanism is individually rational and budget-balanced. The experiments demonstrate that our auction mechanism efficiently increases the number of winners and improves the auctioneer's profit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless communications have been developed to address the high rate of wireless traffic demand. Explosive intelligent equipment has enormous costs in terms of network energy, placing a strain on spectrum resources [1] . A flexible and reasonable spectrum allocation scheme is an important way to improve low utilization of spectrum due to traditional fixed spectrum allocation [2] , [3] . It is helpful to use cognitive radio for spectrum sharing, and spectrum allocation is one of the main problems in cognitive radio networks. From the viewpoint of economics, auction theory is an efficient method to obtain the maximum benefits; e.g., the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has raised more than forty billion dollars for the Treasury of the United States of America by conducting thirty three spectrum auctions [4] . Therefore, spectrum auctions have been widely studied by scholars around the world, and there are great differences over spectrum usage among various geographical regions. Spectrum utility can be greatly improved by spectrum auctions, whereby secondary users can access the under-utilized spectrum occupied by primary users. Moreover, both primary users and secondary users can benefit from the auction. The primary user treats the valuation of the rental channel as the seller's asking price and the secondary user's valuation of the demand channel as the buyer's bid. Unlike traditional commodity auctions, the design of the auction mechanism for spectrum requires taking into account the reuse of spectrum and improving the spectrum utilization as much as possible. At the same time, the authenticity of the auction mechanism must also be guaranteed, i.e., the buyers and sellers take their true valuation as the bid to participate in the auction. In this case, their interests are maximized to prevent cheating [5] , [6] .
Many traditional auction mechanisms [7] , [8] are not suitable for spectrum auctions. The spatial reusability of spectrums should be captured, and the spectrum auction should be guaranteed to be truthful [9] , [10] . The main issue is to design an efficient truthful auction mechanism. Various mechanisms have also been designed for spectrum auctions in recent years. Zhou and Zheng [11] grouped buyers based on the model of a given interference graph and make use of the McAfee double auction mechanism [12] to propose the first truthful spectrum double auction mechanism that captures spectrum reuse. Yao et al. [13] designed a novel virtual bidding mechanism, that is also truthful to improve the spectrum utilization. Dong et al. [14] decoupled the seller and buyer sides to design a double auction for spectrum allocation. Although these early studies work well, they neglected an important economic property, i.e., the profit from the auction [15] .
Gopinathan and Li [16] designed a spectrum auction for maximizing revenue based on prior-free setting. Yang et al. [17] designed a truthful mechanism to maximize the benefit of the auctioneer. But these mechanisms assumed identical spectrums, which is not practical. Each channel may have unique characteristics in reality, e.g., the location, bandwidth, transmission range and so on. In order to clearly express their individual demands, buyers should have different bids for heterogeneous spectrums. Feng et al. [18] proposed the first truthful double auction mechanism, named TAHES, for heterogeneous spectrums. A new grouping algorithm is designed to address heterogeneity between channels. Then, the winners are determined by the McAfee double auction mechanism. However, the auctioneer benefits are very low due to the guarantee of truthfulness. In sum, we should consider more factors so that the auction can maximize the profit of the auctioneer with security and low energy [19] . It is interesting that the auction results including the profit of the auctioneer are significantly influenced by different group strategies [20] . In addition, we should make use of the more practical interference model to enhance spectrum utilization.
In this paper, we adopt the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) constraints to model the interference relationships between users. Then, we make use of a new grouping algorithm based on the achievable SINR [21] . The group size of the secondary users is maximized instead of making use of greedy algorithm to remove users from the group in [22] or obtain the approximated solution of the group capacity by linear programming relaxation to in [23] and [24] . In this situation, energy efficiency is improved, while the quality of service of the primary users is also guaranteed [25] . We adopt the novel group bid, i.e., the bid of the buyers in a group, to tap the potential market power. Finally, we design a novel discriminatory pricing strategy for the competitive double auction to extract more profit from the auction. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We raise the number of successful transactions in the auction through the designed competitive double auction using a discriminatory pricing strategy for heterogeneous spectrums to enhance the profit of the auctioneer.
• We adopt a novel grouping algorithm that considers spectrum reusability, reality and various user demands.
• We analyze the economic characteristics of our auction mechanism including truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We firstly introduce the interference and auction model in Section II. Then, we discuss the preliminary knowledge for the double auction in Section III. We propose our auction mechanism and demonstrate it in detail in Section IV. In Section V, we prove that our auction mechanism has three necessary economic characteristics. In Section VI, simulation results verify that our auction mechanism offers significant benefits to auctioneers. Section VII concludes the paper and presents ideas for future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we model the behavior of the primary users and secondary users as a double auction. Consider a cognitive radio network consisting of one primary base station with L m primary users and L s secondary users. Primary users do not make full use of the spectrum and thus wish to gain profit by temporarily sharing their channels with secondary users. Meanwhile, the secondary users would like to pay the primary users for the spectrum resources. Therefore, the primary base station holds a single-round sealed-bid double auction between them. Typically, primary users and secondary users are selfish. The primary base station wants to obtain profits through the auction. Without loss of generality, assume for ease of demonstration that each primary user as the seller has only one channel to sell and that each secondary user as the buyer just needs to buy one channel. In addition, the channels are independent of each other. Our model can be easily generalized to networks where each channel has more primary users. 
In most previous works [17] , [18] , [20] , [26] , a conflict graph is typically adopted to model the interference between secondary users. It is more practical and efficient when the users normally communicate with tolerable interference from other terminals. Thus, we adopt the SINR model to VOLUME 6, 2018 address this issue. A set of secondary users could simultaneously communicate on a sharing channel as long as the received SINRs are larger than the given SINR thresholds. The received SINR of the m-th primary user and the s-th secondary user in m-th channel is given in terms of the transmit power p = [p m ; p m ] as:
and:
respectively, where the script m represents the m-th primary user with the m-th channel, the script s represents the s-th secondary user, G m sl is the channel gain from the l-th secondary transmitter to the s-th secondary receiver in the m-th channel, and σ s is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the s-th user.
In addition to ensuring for all users the economic properties discussed in the following Sections III and V, we aim to maximize profit, which is defined as:
where f s denotes the final price paid by the s-th buyer and g m denotes the payment to the m-th seller.
III. PRELIMINARY
We introduce the background of the auction mechanism and show the necessary economic properties for the design of the auction in this section. There are many classical auction models. In the classical single sided auctions for one seller and multiple buyers, each buyer submits a bid indicating the highest price for the goods that they would like to pay at the beginning of the auction. According to the bid vector b, the auctioneer calculates an allocation plan x and final pricing f based on certain rules. Generally speaking, the final pricing for all winners is not larger than their bids, i.e., 0 ≤ f s ≤ b s , and the losers pay f s = 0. Lastly, the profit of the auction is L s s=1 f s . In double sided auctions for multiple buyers and sellers, there is the same number of winners as sellers. Then, all winners of the sellers are larger than their asking price, i.e., g m ≥ v m , and the losers of the sellers are not paid, i.e., g m = 0. Meanwhile, the pricing for the winners of the buyers satisfies 0 ≤ f s ≤ b sm . Finally, the profit of the auction is
In sum, the auction process generally contains four steps as stated in Figure 1 . 
A. BID-INDEPENDENT GROUPING
At the beginning of the auction, the auctioneer collects individual information including the bids of all sellers and buyers. This information is confidential throughout the whole auction. Then, the auctioneer enhances spectrum reuse by grouping buyers based on their channel availabilities and interference conditions. In other words, each channel can only support limited secondary users to satisfy their communication requirements. There are various grouping methods when there are too many secondary users to access in the literature. Typically, the interference graph is used to describe the relationship of the signal interference between secondary users. The vertices of the graph represent the user, and the edges represent interference between users. Two users are in mutual conflict if there is an edge between the two vertices; then, they cannot share the same spectrum. The grouping of secondary users based on interference graphs is equivalent to the problem of finding the maximum independent set of graphs. In addition, the grouping algorithm should satisfy the important condition of truthfulness, which is bidindependent.
B. GROUP BID DETERMINATION
The first grouping step divides the buyers into several groups. Regard each group as a new super buyer in the auction, meaning that an approach is needed to determine the group bid, so that we explore the potentiality of the greatest profit in guaranteeing truthfulness and individual rationality. In this way, the number of winners for the secondary users can be improved.
C. BIPARTITE GRAPH MATCHING
Note that we assume that each buyer can only purchase one channel, and the same is true for the group buyer. There would be market manipulation if each buyer could bid on multiple channels. Thus, one-to-one relationships between sellers and buyers should be put in place. Different matching strategies may have a different number of winners, even if these buyer groups have the same group bid.
D. WINNER AND PRICING DECISION
We formulate the original problem as a standard double auction through the grouping and matching steps. The winners of the auction and the clearing price for the buyers and sellers should be determined in this step.
Furthermore, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction model in [27] considered the influence of winners on the others. They aim to fashion a profit maximization mechanism, satisfying certain constraints of the auction. However, the tradeoff between the economic properties and complexity is hard to achieve in this model. As discussed in previous works [11] , [13] , [18] , the design of the auction needs to take the following important economic characteristics into account. 1) Truthfulness: Participants cannot enhance their utility by misreporting a bid. If the dominant strategy of all bidders is to bid their true expectation, the auction is truthful.
2) Individual rationality: If all wining sellers are not paid less than their corresponding asking price and all winning buyers pay more than their corresponding bid, the auction is characterized by individual rationality.
3) Budget balance: If the final profit for the auctioneer is non-negative, i.e., the total price paid by the buyers is larger than the total payment to the sellers, the auction is budget balanced.
In practice, the same spectrum could be shared by different users at the same time through multiplexing. Therefore, the spatial and temporal reuse of spectrum should be taken into account in the design of the spectrum auction mechanism to improve spectrum utilization. In addition, there are difficulties when applying a traditional auction mechanism to a spectrum auction. For example, the traditional second price auction mechanism first sorts the bid in descending order, and then the top buyer wins the auction and pays the buyer's bid. The mechanism is first proposed and proved by Vickery in [7] , and the allocation and pricing algorithm can be simply applied to the spectrum auction as follows.
1) The users bid according to the formation of a new series of buyers from high to low order and initial the available channel set for each secondary user as all channels.
2) Allocate the channel with the minimum ordinal number to the user with the current highest bid. Then, remove this allocated user from the buyer set and remove the allocated channel from the available channel set for all buyers who are in conflict.
3) Repeat
Step 2 until the allocation is finished. 4) For each victorious secondary user, it costs the highest price of all failed users who conflict with the charged user. If there is no user in conflict, it costs zero.
The second price auction mechanism is contrary to an authentic scenario, as shown in the example given in Figure 2 showing that the allocation and pricing algorithms are not truthful. There are four sub users {a, b, c, d} that compete to buy two channels {h 1 , h 2 }, where v represents the real valuation, b represents actual bids, and u represents the obtained benefits. As you can see from the figure, their real valuation is {5, 4, 1, 2}, respectively. According to the above second price auction mechanism, the auction result is shown in Figure 2 (a) if they bid according to the real valuation. The users a and d win the channel h 1 , user b wins the channel h 2 , and user c does not win any channel. Then, the profit is {5, 3, 0, 1}, respectively. However, the auction results will become Figure 2 (b) if the users c cheat their bid by increasing it to three. Then, user c is able to win a channel and needs to pay the price of zero. Thus, its real income is greater than that of its bid as his profit will become one, which is a violation of the authenticity of the auction. Traditionally, the double McAfee auction mechanism in [12] matches one by one between the buyers and the sellers to ensure that the profit of the entire auction is positive. In the auction process, McAfee sorts the seller's asking price from low to high (e.g., assuming that v 1 ≤ v 2 ≤ · · · ≤ v L m ) and sorts the buyer's bid from high to low (e.g., assuming that
Then, find out the last buyer k whose bid is greater than or equal to the seller's asking price, i.e., k = arg max v k ≤ b k . Let the front of the k − 1 buyers and sellers win the auction. Finally, all buyers need to pay the price b k , and all sellers are paid by the price v k . Although McAfee has the three economic characteristics, it is granted part of the profit of the auction to ensure truthfulness at the same time. Table 1 is the summary of a comparison of current state-of-the-art auction mechanisms.
IV. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION FOR DOUBLE AUCTION
In this section, we propose the truthful double auction mechanism for heterogeneous spectrum to improve the profit of the auctioneer with the necessary economic characteristics. Figure 1 shows the auction process and the difference between our mechanism and TAHES. Next, we discuss each step in detail.
A. BID-INDEPENDENT GROUPING
We obtain the maximum supported set of buyers on each channel subjected to the SINR requirements. In general, finding the largest set of buyers is an NP-hard combinatorial problem and is difficult to solve [33] . By adding the auxiliary variable q j to the right side of the SINR constraints for the j-th buyers, we formulate this feasibility optimization problem as the following nonconvex optimization problem:
where q can be regarded as the effect of SINR margins affecting all SINR thresholds to guarantee the SINR not dropping below the SINR thresholds when there is fluctuation in the dynamic networks. When the number of buyers is large, it is not practical to check all combinations of the buyers to select a feasible supported set with the maximum cardinality for each channel. Note that (4) is always feasible. We have q j > 0 when the SINR requirement of the j-th buyer cannot be satisfied. Intuitively, a feasible set of buyers can then be obtained by removing all users satisfying q j > 0 at the optimality of (4). There are many methods to deal with this problem in the cognitive radio networks. Zhai et al. [21] dealt with this problem by considering the minimum power consumption based on a convex approximation algorithm. We adopt this algorithm to obtain the supported maximum buyer sets, ζ = {ζ 1 , ζ 2 , . . . , ζ m }, for all channels. Next, we iteratively select the common sets from ζ by considering the important parameter, i.e., the size of set, which reveals the influence of the group size. Moreover, we consider the multiple spectrum access to satisfy the buyers' requirements for heterogeneous channels. Given a common set G, let the trade-off be , which is defined as follows:
where C(·) indicates the number of common channels that all buyers in this set can access, and α denotes the weight for the number of common channels. When the number of buyers is far larger than the number of sellers, we should adopt a relatively large α so that the C(·) is more influential and vice versa. We denote the allocation of the buyer sets as a matrix X with each entry, where x si = 1 means the s-th buyer contributes to the i-th common set G i and otherwise set x si = 0. Now, we formulate the common set selection problem for G i as a multiple objects optimization problem:
We adopt the NSGA-II in [34] , which is a sortingbased non-dominated multi-objective evolutionary algorithm to deal with (6) . We obtain k potential solutions by executing the NSGA-II method, where k is the predefined fixed experimental number. Then, we choose the best solution according to the criteria (G). Note that α is relevant to the number of remaining groups and buyers in this iteration, and thus it needs to be iteratively changed. Lets represent the number of remaining buyers, andm represent the number of remaining groups. Then, α is experimentally chosen betweens/3m and s/2m, which will be demonstrated in detail in Section VI. We have k different α by dividing the range of α into k − 1 parts. For each α, we select the best solution from the corresponding previous k solutions. Finally, we select the solution that is hit most to be the best solution. Now, we propose our Algorithm 1, where the algorithm in [21] is denoted as the Maximum Supported Group (MSG) method, and M = {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M L m } represents the channels of the sellers.
Algorithm 1 Bid-Independent Buyer Grouping
Require:
all users' SINR requirementsγ and the maximum transmission power vectorp, the sellers' channels M, the set of buyers to be grouped O.
Ensure:
the groups of the buyers G.
Execute the MSG method to obtain the maximum supported set ζ m . 3: end for 4: while O = ∅ do 5: Execute the NSGA-II method to obtain k potential solutions 6: α =s/4m 7: while α ≤s/2m do 8: for i = 1 : k do 9:
end for 11: The solution with the maximum (G i ) is hit 12: α = α + (s/2m −s/4m)/(k − 1) 13: end while 14: Select the solution G i , which is hit most 15: For
Get rid of the empty group 17 : Next, we determine the bid for each new buyer group. We could time the group size by the the minimum bid of the group in common. But it generates less profit as it cannot explore the purchasing power of the group, although it is truthful. Therefore, we improve the profit by proposing a novel discriminatory pricing algorithm based on the basic group bid, which is defined as below. 
while each buyer in the group adopts the same bid.
Next, we reconsider the bid of the buyers and then compute the group bid according to the basic group bid. In each channel, we have the following steps.
• In each group G m , divide the total buyers' bids of this channel by the group size to be b
where n is the number of the groups.
• Sort the group bid vector b G in the ascending order.
• Project the bids of the buyers who bid for this channel to the nearest b G i , e.g., the b ij is approximated to be b
• Recompute the group bid based on the new adjusted bids in each channel. Adopt the basic group bid instead if the basic is larger than the new group bid. Now, we propose our Algorithm 2. Matrix A represents the buyer's channel availability. Its entries a ij = 1 denote i-th buyer could access channel M j .
Algorithm 2 Group Bid Rounding

Require:
the buyer groups G and the buyer's bid matrix B, the buyer's channel availability matrix A. Ensure:
the adjusted buyer's bid matrixB, the group bid matrix B G . 1: for M i in M do 2: for G k in G do 3: Determine the total bid k of buyers in G k who can access channel M i .
4:
end for 5: Sort the total bid k in the ascending order as 1 , 2 , . . . , n .
6:
for the j-th buyer do 7: Adjust b ji to the nearest if a ji = 1.
8:
end for 9: Determine the group bids vector for channel M i as b iG . 10 :
Recover the buyers' bids in group G k .
12:
Adopt the basic group bid for group G k . 13: end if 14: end for 15: return B G ;
C. BIPARTITE GRAPH MATCHING
When the group buyer can bid for multiple channels at the same time, there is market manipulation because some buyers can strategically change some of their bids [18] . Then, they can change the price that they need to pay in order to lower the group bids and increase their utility. Therefore, we tackle this issue by adopting the weighted maximum matching of a bipartite graph, which is a one-to-one mapping between the sellers and the group buyers.
D. WINNER AND PRICING DECISION
There are some main parameters used in the decision process. 
Definition 3: The $ R ( b, v) extracts the target profit R from the auction, which is described as follows:
1) Sort the bid vector of buyers in ascending order as b, and sort the asking price vector in descending order as v.
2) Obtain the largest k where k
3) The first k − 1 sellers are paid by v k and the first k − 1 buyers pay the price b k because all of them win the auction, assuming that k > 1.
There are various group buyers and sellers, regarded as P, based on the matching result in Step 3. Let m(·) denote the matching result, i.e., m(G k ) is the matched seller of the k-th group buyer, and δ(w i ) denote the group id of w i -th buyer. Then, we could adopt the traditional double auction mechanisms, e.g., McAfee in [12] . But the auctioneer can only obtain minimal profit from the McAfee auction. Motivated by the competitive auction in [35] , we propose a mechanism in the following Algorithm 3, which is more suitable for the heterogeneous spectrum double auction and produces high profit at the same time.
We randomly divide the matched results into two pair sets as ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 . Then, the original bid vectors are split into b ϕ 1 , b ϕ 2 , v ϕ 1 and v ϕ 2 , respectively. Next, we get the highest profit for the pairs in each set as sp 1 
We determine the winning sellers and group buyers based on the results $ sp 2 ( b ϕ 1 , v ϕ 1 ) on ϕ 1 and $ sp 1 ( b ϕ 2 , v ϕ 2 ) on ϕ 2 . The group buyers and their corresponding matched sellers win together only if they are all in the winning set because they are previously matched.
In the winning group, each buyer w i pays the price
, and each seller benefits from payment v k .
V. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
In this section, we demonstrate that our proposed new double auction mechanism, also named TPAHS, has three economic characteristics, i.e., individual rationality, truthfulness and budget balance [36] . 
Algorithm 3 Winner Determination and Pricing
Require:
the matched pairs between the group buyers and sellers. Ensure:
the winning buyer groups and the sellers, the clearing price, the profit. 
Calculate $ sp 1 ( b ϕ 2 , v ϕ 2 ) on ϕ 2 8: else 9: Calculate $ sp 2 Let v i denote the bid for the i-th winning seller; we obtain its profit with v k − v i > 0.
Lemma 1: The proposed grouping method is bidindependent for individual buyers.
Proof: The proposed grouping method is according to the SINR constraints of the buyers and sellers and thus is not related to the value of an individual bid.
Lemma 2: The proposed bid determination is truthful for individual buyers.
Proof: For each buyer w i , we consider the four scenarios in Table 2 , c.f. [37] .
1) The buyer w i loses the auction and has a profit of zero whenever the buyer is honest or lying.
2) The buyer w i loses the auction and has a profit of zero if it is lying. On the contrary, the profit is larger than zero if w i bids honestly and wins the auction based on Theorem 1.
3) The buyer w i loses the auction and obtains a profit of zero by honest bidding, i.e., b ij = v ij and b
In order to win the auction, the buyer would like to enlarge the group bid to joint the winning group. One possible way is to bid onb ij > b G k+1 based on the bid determination algorithm, and the corresponding profit is
4) When the buyer w i bids larger than its true expectation, the profit will decrease because it pays not less than the honest bid despite winning the auction. When the buyer bids smaller instead, it needs to bid smaller than b G k with b G k < b ij < b G k+1 to change its final price. However, the buyer w i needs to bid much smaller than his true expectation, which violates the reality [37] if the difference between the group average bids is very big.
In sum, no buyer can enhance its profit by cheating. Lemma 3: The winner determination and pricing process is truthful for group buyers and sellers.
Proof: The proposed winner determination algorithm is according to the double auction mechanism in [38] , which is truthful for both the buyers and sellers. But the pricing strategy of the buyers is different from [38] . It is possible for the group buyers that do not win any channel as they can only occupy the matched channel. The winning buyer group b G k still loses the auction when the corresponding matched channel for b G k does not belong to the winning sellers. But b G k cannot affect the matched results by cheating bid as the matching process is bid-independent. In other words, b G k still loses the auction despite lying about being the highest bid. So do the sellers. Therefore, the proposed winner determination and pricing is truthful.
Lemma 4: The seller u i will win the auction by bidding c i < c i too when it wins with the ask c i .
Proof: In the matching algorithm, the seller u i is still matched to the same group buyer no matter how much it bids, as the proposed matching algorithm is bid-independent. Based on Lemma 3, the winner determination and pricing strategy is truthful for the sellers too. Therefore, the proposed mechanism is monotonic for the sellers.
Theorem 2: The proposed auction mechanism is truthful. Proof: The truthfulness for the sellers could be similarly proved to be one of the buyers based on Lemma 4. In addition, with Lemmas 3 and 2, the proposed auction mechanism is truthful for buyers. Therefore, the proposed auction mechanism is proved to be truthful, as it is bid/ask-independent [38] .
Theorem 3:
The proposed auction mechanism is budget balanced.
Proof: The winner determination and pricing strategy is based on the definition of $ R . Therefore, the profit of the auction is R ≥ 0.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we numerically estimate the performance of our proposed auction mechanism for the heterogeneous spectrums.
A. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
In the simulation, we randomly produce primary users as the sellers and secondary users as the buyers. The secondary users are distributed on a 800 × 800m square. The range of interference is between 200m and 300m based on the different channels. To perform a comparison with the TAHES with respect to the interference graph, we consider that the two secondary users have a conflict between each other when the interference range is larger than the distance between them [17] , [18] . We adopt the SINR constraints and calculate the channel gain based on the model G = kd −i , where d represents the distance between two users, k is a constant reflecting the path loss and i denotes the heterogeneity of channels. Without loss of generality, the budgets of the power constraints and the SINR requirements for all secondary users are the same as p = 1W and γ = 0.5, respectively. The asks of the sellers and the bids of the buyers are distributed in [10] and [35] and [10] and [20] , respectively. We randomly produce the channel availability matrix A, ensuring that each buyer can purchase one channel at least.
We mainly focus on the following metrics of the simulation:
• The profit of the auctioneer, • The number of winning buyers, • The comparisons on different parameters α. 
B. RESULTS ANALYSIS
We demonstrate the comparison of the profits produced by the auction of TAHES and the proposed mechanism, i.e., TPAHS, in Figure 3 . The M /N represents the number of sellers and buyers. It can be seen that M ranges from 5 to 15 with a step of 2 and N ranges from 50 to 150 with a step of 20. It is shown that the profit of TPAHS is far more than that of TAHES. This is due to the novel random competitive double auction with the new grouping method and the discriminatory pricing strategy. In addition, the profit increases with the increment of the primary users and secondary users in general. As the random generated input may produce very low profit, a slight drop could occur when the availability matrix is sparse or the buyers' bids are low.
We also present a comparison of the number of winning buyers between TAHES and TPAHS in Figure 4 . It can be seen that the winning buyers of the proposed auction are more than that of TAHES. The winner determination in our random competitive double auction costs some buyers in the other partition, leading to the decrease in the number of winning buyers. Therefore, the results imply that our grouping algorithm according to the SINR constraints improves spectrum efficiency with a low amount of energy.
Next, we show the influence of different parameter α, taking the average group size and profit as the metrics. Let the number of sellers be 8 and the number of buyers range from 40 to 100. The remaining inputs are randomly produced in each round. We consider the following four scenarios:
• alpha-1: α ∈ [0.5, 1.5), • alpha-2: α ∈ [1.5, 2.5), • alpha-3: α ∈ [2.5, 3.5),
• alpha-4: α ∈ [3.5, 4.5). Figure 5 (a) reveals that average group size increases with α as α is the weight parameter of group size when we calculate the (G) in the grouping algorithm. Figure 5 (b) shows the difference between the profit of different values of α. It can be found that the profit of alpha-1 is the lowest in general, as the average group size is too small for alpha-1, leading to low profit with inefficient spectrum reusability. It can be seen that alpha-2 and alpha-3 are relatively better than alpha-1 and alpha-4. Therefore, we adopt α ∈ [2, 3] in our grouping process to consider the profit and the successful transactions with low energy at the same time.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed a truthful double auction to joint optimize the profit and internet energy consumption in cognitive radio networks. Compared to the previous works, we adopt a more practical SINR model instead of an interference graph model to group the secondary users, which further improves spectrum reusability with low energy. Then, we design a random competitive double auction with a discriminatory pricing strategy. The proposed auction mechanism possesses the necessary economic characteristics including individual rationality, truthfulness and budget balance. The experimental results demonstrate that our auction works efficiently.
The proposed auction mechanism addressed a static auction in this paper; i.e., the primary users and secondary users are determined at the beginning of the auction. In practice, it is possible for the users to arrive at every time, which requires that the mechanism work in an online fashion. Moreover, the secondary users may like to occupy more than one spectrum in the auction. These problems will be studied in future work.
